The plaintiff merchants shipped a cargo of Indian corn and sent the bill of\u00a0lading to their London agent, who employed the defendant to sell the cargo. On\u00a015 May 1848, the defendant sold the cargo to Challender on credit. The vessel\u00a0had sailed on 23 February but the cargo became so heated and fermented that it\u00a0was unfit to be carried further and sold. On May 23 Challender gave the\u00a0plaintiff notice that he repudiated the contract on the ground that at the time\u00a0of the sale to him the cargo did not exist. The plaintiffs brought an action\u00a0against the defendant (who was a del credere agent, ie, guaranteed the\u00a0performance of the contract) to recover the purchase price.<\/p>\n
Martin B ruled that the contract imported that, at the time of sale, the corn\u00a0was in existence as such and capable of delivery, and that, as it had been sold,\u00a0the plaintiffs could not recover. This judgment was affirmed by the House of\u00a0Lords.<\/p>\n
At 11am on 24 June 1902 the plaintiff had entered into an oral agreement for\u00a0the hire of a room to view the coronation procession on 26 June. A decision to\u00a0operate on the King, which rendered the procession impossible, was taken at 10am\u00a0on 24 June. Wright J held the contract void. The agreement was made on a\u00a0missupposition of facts which went to the whole root of the matter, and the\u00a0plaintiff was entitled to recover his \u00a3100.<\/p>\n
See Cheshire & Fifoot, p239.<\/p>\n
The defendants sold an oil tanker described as lying on Jourmand Reef off\u00a0Papua. The plaintiffs incurred considerable expenditure in sending a salvage\u00a0expedition to look for the tanker. There was in fact no oil tanker, nor any\u00a0place known as Jourmand Reef. The plaintiffs brought an action for (1) breach of\u00a0contract, (2) deceit, and (3) negligence. The trial judge gave judgment for the\u00a0plaintiffs in the action for deceit. He held that Couturier v Hastie<\/i> obliged him\u00a0to hold that the contract of sale was void and the claim for breach of contract\u00a0failed. Both parties appealed.<\/p>\n
The High Court of Australia stated that it was not decided in Couturier v\u00a0<\/i> An uncle told his nephew, not intending to misrepresent anything, but being\u00a0in fact in error, that he (the uncle) was entitled to a fishery. The nephew,\u00a0after the uncle\u2019s death, acting in the belief of the truth of what the uncle had\u00a0told him, entered into an agreement to rent the fishery from the uncle\u2019s\u00a0daughters. However, the fishery actually belonged to the nephew himself. The\u00a0House of Lords held that the mistake was only such as to make the contract\u00a0voidable. Lord Westbury said \u201cIf parties contract under a mutual mistake\u00a0and misapprehension as to their relative and respective rights, the result is\u00a0that that agreement is liable to be set aside as having proceeded upon a common\u00a0mistake\u201d on such terms as the court thought fit to impose; and it was so\u00a0set aside.<\/p>\n N.B. According to Smith & Thomas, A Casebook on Contract<\/i>, Tenth edition,\u00a0p506, \u201cAt common law such a contract (or simulacrum of a contract) is more\u00a0correctly described as void, there being in truth no intention to a\u00a0contract\u201d. However, Denning LJ applied Cooper v Phibbs<\/i> in Solle v Butcher<\/i> (1949) (below).<\/p>\n For facts, see above. The House of Lords set the agreement aside on the terms\u00a0that the defendant should have a lien on the fishery for such money as the\u00a0defendant had\u00a0expended on its improvements.<\/p>\n The defendant, having refused to sell some property to the plaintiff for\u00a0\u00a32,000, wrote a letter in which, as the result of a mistaken calculation, he\u00a0offered to sell it for \u00a31,250. The plaintiff accepted but the defendant refused\u00a0to complete. Romilly MR refused a decree of specific performance.<\/p>\n A rogue named Wallis ordered some goods, on notepaper headed \u201cHallam\u00a0& Co\u201d, from King\u2019s Norton. The goods were paid for by a cheque drawn by\u00a0\u201cHallam & Co\u201d. King\u2019s Norton received another letter purporting to\u00a0come from Hallam & Co, containing a request for a quotation of prices for\u00a0goods. In reply King\u2019s Norton quoted prices, and Hallam then by letter ordered\u00a0some goods, which were sent off to them. These goods were never paid for. Wallis\u00a0had fraudulently obtained these goods and sold them to Edridge Merret, who\u00a0bought them bona fide. King\u2019s Norton brought an action to recover damages for\u00a0the conversion of the goods.<\/p>\n It was held by the Court of Appeal held that if a person, induced by false\u00a0pretences, contracted with a rogue to sell goods to him and the goods were\u00a0delivered the rogue could until the contract was disaffirmed give a good title\u00a0to a bona fide purchaser for value. The plaintiffs intended to contract with the\u00a0writer of the letters. If it could have been shown that there was a separate\u00a0entity called Hallam & Co and another entity called Wallis then the case\u00a0might have come within the decision in Cundy v Lindsay<\/a>. In the opinion of AL\u00a0Smith LJ, there was a contract by the plaintiffs with the person who wrote the\u00a0letters, by which the property passed to him. There was only one entity, trading\u00a0it might be under an alias, and there was a contract by which the property\u00a0passed to him.<\/p>\n The defendant offered in writing to let a pub to the plaintiff at \u00a363 pa.<\/p>\n After a conversation with the defendant\u2019s clerk, the plaintiff accepted by\u00a0letter, believing that the \u00a363 rental was the only payment under the contract.<\/p>\n In fact, the defendant had intended that a \u00a3500 premium would also be payable\u00a0and he believed that his clerk had explained this to the plaintiff. The\u00a0defendant refused to complete and the plaintiff brought an action for specific\u00a0performance. The court refused the order of specific performance but the\u00a0defendant was liable in damages.<\/p>\n The plaintiff agreed to sell cotton to the defendant which was \u201cto\u00a0arrive ex Peerless from Bombay\u201d. When the cotton arrived the plaintiff\u00a0offered to deliver but the defendants refused to accept the cotton. The\u00a0defendants pleaded that the ship mentioned was intended by them to be the ship\u00a0called the Peerless, which sailed from Bombay in October and that the plaintiff\u00a0had not offered to deliver cotton which arrived by that ship, but instead\u00a0offered to deliver cotton which arrived by another ship, also called Peerless,\u00a0which had sailed from Bombay in December.<\/p>\n Judgment was given for the defendants. It was held that there was nothing on\u00a0the face of the contract to show which Peerless was meant; so that this was a\u00a0plain case of latent ambiguity, as soon as it was shown that there were two\u00a0Peerlesses from Bombay; and parol evidence could be given when it was found that\u00a0the plaintiff meant one and the defendants the other. If this was the case,\u00a0there was no consensus ad idem, and therefore no binding contract.<\/p>\n The defendants bid at an auction for two lots, believing both to be hemp. In\u00a0fact Lot A was hemp but Lot B was tow, a different commodity in commerce and of\u00a0very little value. The defendants declined to pay for Lot B and the sellers sued\u00a0for the price. The defendants\u2019 mistake arose from the fact that both lots\u00a0contained the same shipping mark, \u201cSL\u201d, and witnesses stated that in\u00a0their experience hemp and tow were never landed from the same ship under the\u00a0same shipping mark. The defendants\u2019 manager had been shown bales of hemp as\u00a0\u201csamples of the \u2018SL\u2019 goods\u201d. The auctioneer believed that the bid was\u00a0made under a mistake as to the value of the tow.<\/p>\n Lawrence J said that as the parties were not ad idem the plaintiffs could\u00a0recover only if the defendants were estopped from relying upon what was now\u00a0admittedly the truth. He held that the defendants were not estopped since their\u00a0mistake had been caused by or contributed to by the negligence of the\u00a0plaintiffs.<\/p>\n The defendant, an elderly gentleman, signed a bill of exchange on being told\u00a0that it was a guarantee similar to one which he had previously signed. He had\u00a0only been shown the back of it. It was held that there should be a new trial.<\/p>\n Byles J stated:<\/p>\n \u201cIt seems plain, on principle and on authority, that if a blind man, or\u00a0a man who cannot read, or who, for some reason (not implying\u00a0negligence)\u00a0<\/em>forbears to read, has a written contract falsely\u00a0read over to him, the reader\u00a0misreading it to such a degree that the written contract is of a nature\u00a0altogether different from the contract pretended to be read from the paper which\u00a0the blind or illiterate man afterwards signs; then at least if there be no\u00a0negligence, the signature obtained is of no force. And it is invalid not merely\u00a0on the ground of fraud, where fraud exists, but on the ground that the mind of\u00a0the signer did not accompany the signature; in other words, he never intended to\u00a0sign and therefore, in contemplation of law, never did sign the contract to\u00a0which his name is appended. In the present case,\u2026 he was deceived, not merely\u00a0as to the legal effect, but as to the actual contents of the instrument.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Mistake Cases covering common mistake, unilateral mistake, and mutual mistake contract law case summaries.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[85],"class_list":["post-5666","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-cases","tag-uk-law"],"yoast_head":"\n
\nHastie<\/i> that the contract in that case was void. The question whether it was void\u00a0or not did not arise. If it had arisen, as in an action by the purchaser for\u00a0damages, it would have turned on the ulterior question whether the contract was\u00a0subject to an implied condition precedent. In the present case, there was a\u00a0contract, and the Commission contracted that a tanker existed in the position\u00a0specified. Since there was no such tanker, there had been a breach of contract,\u00a0and the plaintiffs were entitled to damages for that breach.<\/p>\nCooper v Phibbs<\/a> (1867) LR 2 HL 149<\/h4>\n
Cooper v Phibbs (1867)<\/h4>\n
UNILATERAL MISTAKE<\/h3>\n
Webster v Cecil (1861) 30 Beav 62<\/h4>\n
King\u2019s Norton Metal v Edridge Merret<\/a> (1897) TLR 98<\/h4>\n
MUTUAL MISTAKE<\/h3>\n
Wood v Scarth (1858) 1 F&F 293<\/h4>\n
Raffles v Wichelhaus<\/a> (1864) 2 H&C 906<\/h4>\n
Scriven Bros v Hindley<\/a> [1913] 3 KB 564<\/h4>\n
Foster v Mackinnon (1869) LR 4 CP 704<\/h4>\n
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