How far does the law on free movement suggest that EU citizenship should now be seen as the key status for persons moving between EU Member States?<\/p>\n
When the Maastricht Treaty introduced the formal status of citizenship of the Union (then the EC) in 1992,[1]<\/a> it was clear that EU institutions intended to place it at the core of its realisation of the free movement of persons within the EU. As the CJEU stated in the case of Grzelcyzk <\/em>in 2001, European citizenship aimed to be “the fundamental status of Member States’ citizens.\u201d[2]<\/a> This idea built on the case law and legislation of the previous decades. Whilst \u2018freedom of movement\u2019 was initially allowed on the basis of economic activity \u2013 securing the rights of workers and those wishing to provide or establish services in another EU member state – this narrow definition was subsequently relaxed by the CJEU in cases like Lebon <\/em>and Antonissen<\/em>,[3]<\/strong><\/em><\/a> and the implementation of regulations like 492\/2011 (previously 1612\/68) to include limited rights<\/a> of movement for family members, for those seeking work, and for the non-economically active. <\/p>\n Furthermore, Articles 20 to 25 of the Treaty However, while the CJEU\u2019s interpretation of Although these limits on free movement often Perhaps the most compelling argument for the role Although EU case law allows for non-EU As such, non-EU nationals legally residing in In This The Judgments When However, it is important to consider the limitations In recent years, the CJEU has more clearly This position was confirmed in cases like Alimanovic <\/em>and Garcia Nieto,[20]<\/strong><\/a><\/em> These cases demonstrate that whilst EU When looking at conditions placed on individuals exercising free movement rights, it is therefore clear that a person\u2019s economic status still determines the extent<\/em> and kind <\/em>of free movement they can enjoy as an EU citizen. As discussed previously, under Article 24 of Directive 2004\/38, member states can withhold access to most welfare benefits from all economically inactive citizens during the first three months of residency, except for workers and their family members, and students. Under Regulation 492\/2011, workers also enjoy equal treatment and access to employment in comparison to the economically inactive.[22]<\/a> Furthermore,<\/em> the entitlement of an EU worker or EU citizen\u2019s family members to enjoy the same rights as that worker is usually derived from the latter\u2019s economic status; they are ‘parasitic’ on the rights of the economically active EU citizen in question.<\/p>\n On this basis, it is clear that any EU nationals who fall It is also important to examine the scope and Article 45(4) TFEU also adds another key exception Clearly, the fact that these derogations are When looking at the case law and legislation on free movement and EU citizenship, it seems clear that the extent to which EU citizenship is key to enjoying freedom of residence and movement within the EU has depended on the CJEU\u2019s attempt to find a careful balance between the rights of individual citizens and the interests of member states. To be an EU citizen, individuals have to first be a national citizen of a member state \u2013 connecting these two forms of status has allowed the CJEU to distinguish between categories of residents<\/em> and to give member states flexibility in their implementation of EU law.[28]<\/a> This has created a unique, if incrementally changing approach to newer issues like immigration and the ultimate need to uphold the fundamental freedoms upon which the EU is based. <\/p>\n The CJEU As such, meeting the conditions set by EU Case 115-116\/81 Adoui and Cornuaille v Belgium <\/em>[1982] ECR 1665.<\/a><\/p>\n Case 149\/79 Commission Case Case 316\/85 Courc’e’iles Case 67\/74 Bonsignore Case<\/em> C-140\/12 Pensionsversicherungsanstalt Case C\u201133\/07 Case C-184\/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre Public Case C-207\/78 Ministere Case C-209\/03 R (Bidar) v London Borough of Ealing<\/em>, [2005] ECR I-2119. <\/p>\n Case C-267\/83 Diatta v Case C-292\/88 R Case C-299\/14 Garc\u00eda-Nieto<\/em>, EU:C:2016:114.<\/p>\n Case C-308\/14 Commission v United Kingdom<\/em>. EU:C:2016:436<\/p>\n Case C-34\/09 Zambrano v. Office national de l\u2019emploi (ONEm)<\/em> 8 March [2011] ECR I-nyr<\/p>\n Case C-370\/90 R v Case <\/em>C-67\/14 Jobcenter Berlin Neuk\u00f6lln v Nazifa, Sonita, Valentina and Valentino Alimanovic <\/em>[2015] Alimanovic <\/em>[2015] WLR (D) 384<\/p>\n Case C-85\/96 Maria Case C\u2011200\/02 Zhu Case C\u2011333\/13 Dano v R v The Secretary of State Consolidated Treaty of Lisbon Charter of Treaty on Council Directive 90\/364\/EEC on the Council Directive 90\/365\/EEC (OJ L 180<\/a>, 13 July 1990, pp 28\u201329); <\/p>\n Council Directive 90\/366\/EEC on the Council Directive 2004\/38\/EC, 29 April Council Directive 73\/148\/EEC, 21 May Council Regulation 883\/2004\/EC on the Council Regulation. 492\/2011 on Council Regulation 987\/2009\/EC laying A Dashwood and S O\u2019Leary (eds.), 2e Principle of Equal Treatment in E.C. Law<\/em> Barnard C, The Baub\u00f6ck R, Craig P, De Craig PP and De Hailbronner, K. (2006), \u201cUnion Koutrakos P, Nic Shuibhne N and Syrpis P, Exceptions from EU free movement law: derogation, justification and proportionality<\/em>, vol 66. (Hart Publishing 2016)<\/p>\n Nic Shuibhne N Thiel M and Baub\u00f6ck, R, de Witte, F & Shaw, J (eds.) \u2018Freedom of movement under attack: Is it worth defending as the core of EU citizenship?\u2019<\/em> Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2016\/69. <\/p>\n Damay L and Koslowski R, \u2018Intra-EU O’Leary S and Oliver P and Oliver P, \u2018When, if O\u2019Neill, A, \u2018Free Movement Of EU Citizens Within The EU\u2019, Matrix Chambers. (2011), Accessed on the Eutopia Law Blog: https:\/\/eutopialaw.com\/2011\/12\/16\/matrix-seminar-eu-law-and-immigration\/<\/a> (2nd<\/sup> September 2017)<\/p>\n Portes J, \u2018Immigration, Raucea C, \u2018Fundamental Thielemann E and Wiesbrock EU Law Concentrate https:\/\/global.oup.com\/uk\/orc\/law\/eu\/homewood_concentrate5e\/resources\/annotated\/question2\/suggested\/ <\/p>\n [1]<\/a> European [2]<\/a> Case [3]<\/a> Case<\/a> 316\/85 Courc’e’iles v Lebon [<\/em>1987] [4]<\/a> Case C-413\/99 Baumbast <\/em><\/a>and R v [5]<\/a> Damay [6]<\/a> Case C-34\/09 <\/a>Zambrano<\/em> <\/em>v. <\/em>Office national de l\u2019emploi (ONEm)<\/em> [2011] ECR I-nyr<\/p>\n [7]<\/a> Case<\/a> C\u2011200\/02 [8]<\/a> R v The Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Amarjit Singh Sandhu <\/em>CA, [1983] Imm AR 61.<\/p>\n [9]<\/a> Council Directive [10]<\/a> Convention [11]<\/a> O\u2019Neill, A, \u2018Free Movement Of EU [12]<\/a> Case C-413\/99 Baumbast, <\/em>para. 80.<\/p>\n [13]<\/a> Case C-34\/09 Zambrano, <\/em>paragraphs
\nFor the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) lays down a seemingly
\nextensive set of rights that derive from EU citizenship. It is important to
\nnote that some of these rights apply only to EU citizens and do not include third
\ncountry citizens; access to social security, residency and – more broadly –
\nequal treatment as examples, although legislation including the Citizen\u2019s
\nRights Directive (2004\/38) allows non-EU family members to enjoy rights derived
\nfrom the status of a relative who is an EU citizen. This approach has been bolstered
\nby the CJEU\u2019s judgments in cases like Baumbast<\/em>
\nand Bidar,[4]<\/strong><\/a><\/em>
\nwhere it stated that these secondary or derivative rights directly facilitated
\nthe fundamental, primary right to free movement as one of the three key
\nfreedoms of the EU.<\/p>\n
\ndirectives and rights conferred by EU treaties has been generous in the past,
\nsuggesting the freedom of movement and residence within the territory of Member
\nStates is a core right for EU citizens, it has considerably narrowed the scope
\nand extent of its enjoyment in the last few decades, delineating limitations
\nand conditions laid down in primary and secondary EU legislation. Its case
\nlaw also shows that the extent to which EU citizens enjoy equal treatment is contingent
\non their economic activity, their level of integration in a host member state,
\nand the kind of welfare or social security they want to access.[5]<\/a>
\nFurthermore, although the derogations from free movement and the direct
\ndiscrimination allowed under Article 45 TFEU is often interpreted strictly, they
\nremain broad in application \u2013 the UK has successfully negotiated derogations
\npreventing the free movement of citizens of new member states on grounds of
\npublic policy and security, for example. <\/p>\n
\nfocus on the rights<\/em> of EU citizens in
\na host EU country rather than their ability to move to that country in itself,
\ncurtailing these rights can act as a direct impediment to free movement
\noverall. This move towards conditional, rights-restricted movement has become
\nmore noticeable in the last decade as a direct result of member states\u2019
\nincreasing concerns about the socio-economic burdens of disproportionate
\nmigration between richer and poorer EU states, including the costs of \u2018benefits
\ntourism\u2019 on public services and the economic disadvantages of immigration for
\nnational citizens in those states. When looking at the different priorities and
\nfactors the CJEU has had to balance, it is clear that while EU institutions
\nhave placed citizenship of the Union at the core of free movement to some
\nextent, in practice these freedoms are not determined by the simple possession
\nof EU citizenship.<\/p>\nThe Central Role of EU Citizenship: Restrictions on Third Country Nationals<\/h2>\n
\nof EU citizenship as key to free movement in the EU is the simple fact that only<\/em> European citizens benefit fully
\nfrom the level of free movement and all subsequent rights to equal treatment conferred
\nby EU treaties. Third country nationals (non-EU citizens who live in an EU
\nmember state) are usually excluded from the enjoyment of these rights. <\/p>\n
\ncitizen\u2019s residence when it involves the rights of an EU citizen – in Zambrano,[6]<\/strong><\/a>
\n<\/em>for example, the CJEU ruled that Article
\n20 TFEU precluded a host state from refusing residence for a non-EU national
\nupon whom a minor EU-citizen was dependent, extending its own principle in
\nthe earlier case of Chen[7]<\/strong><\/a><\/em>
\n\u2013 these cases concerned questions of over the right residency in one EU member
\nstate only<\/em>. A Zambrano carer as a non-EU national, for example, cannot move freely between<\/em>
\nmember states, and cannot claim equal treatment or the same rights to social
\nsecurity as enjoyed by EU citizens. Factors used to evaluate their right of
\nresidency include having health insurance and evidence of financial
\nself-sufficiency. In cases like Zambrano<\/em>, the CJEU made it clear that a
\nnon-EU national\u2019s right to reside was derived from that of an EU citizen, but
\nthat their status was not the same\u2013 residency was granted in order to allow
\nthat EU citizen to fully enjoy their own rights. As R v SSHD ex p Sandhu<\/em>
\nconfirms,a non-EU family
\nmember would therefore lose their residency rights in the original member state
\nif the EU citizen from whom this right derived moved to another EU country.[8]<\/a><\/p>\n
\nan EU member state enjoy little to no freedom of movement. If a non-EU national
\nwishes to move to another member state for over three months, they must apply
\nand go through the immigration processes of that state. Whilst their movement is
\nunrestricted within<\/em> the member state
\nin which they legally reside, a non-EU national\u2019s ability to move between <\/em>member countries and to enjoy
\nequal treatment in those states is therefore restricted. Having citizenship of
\nan EU country determines your fundamental right to free movement within the EU more
\nbroadly, as well as the enjoyment of the social and economic benefits of its
\nmember states.<\/p>\nBaumbast<\/em>: Extending Free Movement & Residency to Economically Inactive Citizens<\/h2>\n
\naddition to making a clear distinction between the status of third-country
\nnationals and member state citizens, the CJEU has also relaxed the economic requirements
\nfor free movement to allow non-economically active citizens, those seeking
\nwork, and EU family members of workers to move within the EU, most notably
\nunder the Citizen\u2019s Directive, 2004\/38 and others, like Directive
\n73\/148<\/a>.[9]<\/a>
\nThese pieces of legislation, coupled with the now binding EU Charter for Human
\nRights[10]<\/a>
\nhave allowed the Court to separate an individual\u2019s right to remain in another
\nmember state from their economic status (as a worker or non-worker) and to derive
\nit directly from their status as an EU citizen in itself (or a dependent of an
\nEU citizen exercising their treaty rights).[11]<\/a><\/p>\n
\nright to move and reside for non-economic reasons was laid out in the key case
\nof Baumbast<\/em>, which was decided shortly
\nafter Grzelczyk<\/em>. In Baumbast, <\/em>the CJEU was asked to look at
\nthe direct effect of Article 18(1) TEC (now Article 21 TFEU) or the exact scope
\nof the right to move and reside within the EU. Mr Baumbast, a German national, had
\nbeen refused a renewal of his residence permit by the British government after
\nhe had stopped working in the UK, although his family continued to live a
\nsettled life in the country (his children were attending school, for example).
\nIn reviewing the facts of his case, the CJEU ruled that the TFEU did not
\nrequire EU citizens to pursue economic activities in order to exercise and
\nenjoy their rights. As a national of an EU member state (Germany) and therefore
\nof the EU itself, Mr Baumbast was entitled to live in another member country under
\nArticle 18(1) TEC (Article 21 TFEU),[12]<\/a>
\nregardless of his employment status.<\/p>\n
\nCJEU therefore made it clear that the right of residence under Article
\n18(1) TEC <\/a>was conferred on every<\/em> EU citizen. As such, Mr
\nBaumbast\u2019s children were allowed to stay on in the UK to complete their
\neducation after their father became unemployed, and Article 8 ECHR was engaged.
\nThe Court stated that even if the children\u2019s rights to education could only be
\nderived from Article 12 of Regulation 1612\/6846, which ensures that the children
\nof an EU member state national enjoy the same access to and level of education
\nas the nationals of another member state in which they reside, this article had
\nto be interpreted in line with Article 8 ECHR.[13]<\/a>
\nSimilarly, even if Mr Baumbast had no right to reside in the UK under any other
\nEU law, his and his children\u2019s right to a family life under Article 8 meant
\nthat he should be granted a corresponding right of residence as they were
\ndependent on him as a primary carer (this was also the case in Zambrano,<\/em> for example, as discussed
\npreviously). <\/p>\n
\nin cases like Baumbast <\/em>have been
\nfurther consolidated by the Citizenship Directive, Regulation 2004\/38, which
\noutlines different kinds of residency status, including rights to reside of
\nfamily members. Article 7 of the Directive, for example, allows an individual to
\nbe resident in an EU member state for up to 3 years depending on their status
\nas a verified job seeker. The CJEU has been able to extend free movement for almost
\nall EU citizens as a direct result of this, and has also extended the
\napplication of the principle of non-discrimination in Article 18 TFEU, too, allowing
\neconomically inactive EU citizens parity of treatment in terms of access to the
\nsame social security and benefits as the nationals of their host countries.[14]<\/a><\/p>\n
\nlooking at these developments, it is clear that the Court has expanded the
\nsecondary rights that derive from EU free movement laws in order to allow EU
\ncitizens to enjoy their fundamental rights (non-discrimination, or their ECHR
\nrights, for example) whilst steadily eroding the original economic basis used
\nto justify the granting or restriction of these rights[15]<\/a>
\nat the same time. Using EU citizenship as a means to do so has been central to
\nthis process, defining free movement and residency as rights contingent on
\ncitizenship in and of itself rather than on economic activity.<\/p>\nEU Citizenship: Conditional (But Not Unrestricted) Free Movement?<\/h2>\n
\nplaced on the free movement of EU citizens by other legislation. Whilst the
\nprinciple of non-discrimination and the free movement rights of EU nationals has
\nbeen increasingly determined by their EU citizenship rather than economic
\nactivity, these rights have been qualified by laws looking to address security concerns
\nand manage disproportionate financial strains on the public services of member
\nstates due to inter-state migration. Most crucially, EU nationals lose their right
\nto reside in a host member state if they are found to be an \u201cunreasonable
\nburden\u201d on that country\u2019s public purse.[16]<\/a>
\nDirective 2004\/38, whilst extending the rights of an EU citizen\u2019s family
\nmembers, for example, also limits the right to reside for over three months to
\ncertain \u2018categories\u2019 of people \u2013 students, workers or the self-employed (and
\nfamily members), and the \u201cself-sufficient\u201d. Furthermore, any students in a host
\nEU state can only reside there if they have adequate health insurance (in order
\nto cover any potential expenditure by that state\u2019s public services), and must
\ndeclare they have sufficient resources; conditions the CJEU outlined in Bidar<\/em>.[17]<\/a><\/p>\n
\ndefined these limitations to provide greater precision and less breadth of
\ngenerosity in the interpretation of free movement law. In the seminal judgment in
\nDano,<\/em> the Court stated that an EU citizen from another member state would
\nlose their a right to reside in a host state under EU law if they had
\nmoved there for the \u2018sole purpose\u2019 of claiming social security.[18]<\/a> In Brey<\/em>, it allowed member states to place
\nconditions on an EU citizens right to reside (e.g. having residency for a
\ncertain length of time) in order for them to become eligible for other social security<\/em>
\nbenefits rather than just social assistance<\/em> benefits (income support,
\nfor example, versus job-seeker\u2019s allowance).[19]<\/a> Whilst
\nthis did not strictly discriminate against EU citizens in comparison to host
\ncountry nationals (they were still, in theory, entitled to the same benefits),
\nit gave member states significant discretion in the full implementation of
\nEU-law rights of residency and in determining their own conditions for
\neligibility for welfare. By allowing member states to place conditions on
\nwelfare assistance, the Court in effect allowed member states to greatly limit the
\nviability of movement for those EU citizens without the financial resources or sufficient
\njob security to remain largely independent of a host state\u2019s welfare system.<\/p>\n
\nwhere the CJEU emphasised that EU nationals did not have the right to social
\nassistance during the first three months of their stay in a host member state,
\nor if they were determined to be a job seeker (this included unemployment
\nbenefits). EU citizens seeking jobs were therefore only entitled to social
\nassistance that facilitated access to the jobs market and helped them find
\nemployment, but could not claim benefits by virtue of their unemployed status.
\nIn Commission v UK, <\/em>furthermore, the
\nCJEU extended this principle to cover all social security benefits, not just
\nsocial assistance benefits. Employed EU citizens had to prove that they were
\nengaged in genuine and effective work, and like students under Bidar<\/em>,
\nthose who were economically inactive would have to be self-sufficient in order
\nto continue to exercise Treaty rights in another member state.[21]<\/a><\/p>\n
\ncitizenship does, in theory, allow nationals of member states to move and
\nreside relatively freely within the EU, the CJEU has been sensitive to rising
\nconcerns about \u2018benefits tourism\u2019 and the effects of migration within the bloc.
\nBeing an EU citizen therefore entitles a member state national to free movement
\nwithin the EU, but their exercising of this right is circumscribed by other<\/em> kinds of criteria (their
\nsocio-economic status, for example) which can greatly restrict their ability to
\nmove – directly and indirectly \u2013 by limiting their access to other rights in
\nhost states.<\/p>\nThe Continued Relevance of an EU Citizen\u2019s Economic Status<\/h2>\n
\noutside the categories of economically active and economically inactive
\n(or a dependent) do not have the right to equal treatment, as they do not have
\nthe legal right to reside in and of itself in another EU member state.[23]<\/a> This
\nacts an effective indirect barrier to migration for these EU citizens, as the
\ndiscretion afforded to member states to withhold most social security benefits
\nfrom citizens who are unemployed or cannot prove their self-sufficiency is a
\nprohibitive factor against free movement in reality. <\/p>\nHow Do Derogations Under Article 45 TFEU Effect Free Movement?<\/h2>\n
\nimpact of the derogations allowed under Article 45(3) TFEU, which enable member
\nstates to restrict free movement for allpersons including EU citizens providing
\ntheir grounds are adequate and it falls under the categories listed in the
\nTreaty. Article 45 states that the rights to reside and move freely between EU
\ncountries for economic activities and to reside in a host state as an
\neconomically inactive EU citizen are subject to \u2018limitations justified on
\ngrounds of public policy, public security or public health\u2019.[24]<\/a> Member
\nstate governments can therefore adopt restrictive measures on a case-by-case
\nbasis, relying on any of these three grounds. In recent years, member states have
\nbeen permitted to temporarily derogate from their obligations under the TFEU in
\norder to minimise the impact of migration from new member states upon their own
\nnational labour markets. The UK government, for example, used a \u2018worker
\nregistration scheme\u2019 until 2011; it ensured EU citizens from new member states
\nwere not entitled to any unemployment or non-job-seeking social security
\nbenefits until they had completed at least 12 months of registered work in the
\ncountry. If an EU citizen in the UK failed to remain in employment for the
\nrequisite year, or to meet the conditions of the registration scheme, they
\nwould not qualify for these benefits, and their time in employment would not
\ncount towards the total number of years needed to gain the permanent right to
\nreside.[25]<\/a><\/p>\n
\n\u2013 that the free movement provisions do not apply to public service employees,
\nso that positions involving the exercise of powers granted by public law and
\nthe undertaking of sensitive duties meant to safeguard the interests of a
\nmember state is reserved for nationals only. However, this does not allow for
\ndirect discrimination \u2013 EU citizens cannot be treated differently to nationals
\nonce they have entered the host state\u2019s labour market. In Commission v Belgium<\/em>, for example, the CJEU ruled that although
\nthere were legitimate exceptions in cases where a position required a \u2018special
\nrelationship\u2019 or the \u2018bonds of nationality\u2019 between a government and its
\npeoples in order to fulfil the function served, a blanket public sector
\nemployment ban on non-member state EU citizens was unlawful and failed to
\nsatisfy Belgium\u2019s other obligations under the TFEU.[26]<\/a><\/p>\n
\npermitted show that the rights to move and live freely by virtue of having EU
\ncitizenship are not unrestricted.<\/em> There
\nare exceptions to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of
\nnationality. The rights granted to an individual as an EU citizen have to be
\nconsidered alongside other crucial concerns, like the economic interests and
\nthe general security of member states and the Union itself. Despite the CJEU
\ncontinually narrowing the scope of and defining the guidance on the way
\nnational governments can apply these exceptions,[27]<\/a> these
\nderogations remain important for member states, and the case law demonstrates
\nthe way CJEU has counterbalanced the placement EU citizenship at the core of
\nfree movement rights against a recognised need to have restrictions and limitations
\nin place for citizens exercising these rights in the interests of member
\nstates.<\/p>\nConclusion: Freedom of Movement in Principle, Conditional in Practice<\/h2>\n
\nhas therefore been generous in its interpretation of EU law and has
\nincreasingly used EU citizenship as the basis for free movement rights in theory,<\/em>
\nwhilst limiting the ability of EU citizens to enjoy them indiscriminately in practice; <\/em>allowing
\nmember states to grant different types of residency status to EU citizens based
\non economic and social criteria determined by national governments. By justifying
\nthis practice through its case law, the CJEU allows effective restrictions on
\nfree movement in reality whilst maintaining freedom to move and reside in other
\ncountries in principle. EU institutions have attempted to address state
\nconcerns about migration and security by creating a legal definition of EU
\ncitizenship is based on, rather than independent of, member state nationality,
\nat the core of free movement rights.<\/p>\n
\ncase law in order to exercise full free movement rights is still linked closely
\nto being economically active. Although the EU has relaxed the traditional
\nprinciple of free movement of workers to allow economically inactive citizens a
\nright to reside in other countries under EU law – job-seekers, students and
\nfamily members, as defined in Directive 2004\/38, for example, this is not unlimited
\nor uncontrolled freedom of movement. The ability of an EU citizen to move
\nbetween member states is primarily dictated by their employment status as
\ndetermined by their host state\u2019s government and its labour market; their
\npotential reliance on national welfare systems, and an assessment of their economic
\nself-sufficiency. In this sense, EU citizenship is<\/em> at the core of an
\nindividual\u2019s ability to move between countries, but the scope of this freedom
\nto move and entitlement to equal treatment is constrained by other factors, often
\nin the form of conditions put in place by member states themselves. The CJEU has carefully extended freedoms of movement and its
\nderivative rights to almost<\/em> all EU citizens, but it is clear that member
\nstates still have substantial control over which
\n<\/em>individuals, how <\/em>and when<\/em> EU citizens
\nget to exercise these rights fully.<\/p>\nBibliography<\/h2>\n
Table of Cases <\/h3>\n
\nv Belgium<\/em> [1980] ECR 3881<\/p>\n
\n293\/83 Gravier v
\nCity of Liege<\/em> [1985]
\nECR 593<\/p>\n
\nv Lebon <\/em>[1987] ECR
\n2811,<\/p>\n
\nv Oberstadtdirektor der Stadt K\u00f6ln<\/em> [1975] ECR 297.<\/a><\/p>\n
\nv Peter Brey<\/em><\/p>\n
\nJipa <\/em>[2008] ECR I\u20115157<\/p>\n
\nd’Aide Sociale d’Ottignes-Louvain-la-Neuve (CPAS)<\/em> [2001] ECR I-6193<\/p>\n
\nPublic v Even and ONPTS<\/em> [1979]
\nECR 2019<\/p>\n
\nLand Berlin<\/em> [1985] ECR 567<\/p>\n
\nv Home Secretary, ex p Antonissen<\/em> [1991] ECR I-745<\/p>\n
\nImmigration Appeal<\/em> <\/em>Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of State for the
\nHome Department<\/em> [1991] ECR I-4265<\/p>\n
\nMartinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern<\/em> [1998]
\nECR I-2691<\/a><\/p>\n
\nand Chen <\/em>[2004]
\nECR 1-9925.<\/p>\n
\nJobcenter Leipzig<\/em> [2014]
\nAll ER (D) 142 <\/p>\n
\nfor the Home Department ex parte Amarjit
\nSingh Sandhu <\/em>CA, [1983] Imm AR 61.<\/p>\nEU Legislation<\/h3>\n
Primary Legislation<\/em><\/h4>\n
\nversion of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 13 December
\n2007, 2008\/C 115\/01<\/p>\n
\namending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European
\nCommunity [2007] OJ C306\/01<\/p>\n
\nFundamental Rights of the European Union: 2010 O.J. (C83) 389<\/p>\n
\nEuropean Union, 7 February 1992, 1992 O.J. (C191) 1, 31 I.L.M. 253. <\/p>\nSecondary Legislation<\/em><\/h4>\n
\nright of residence for persons of sufficient means (OJ L 180<\/a>, 13 July 1990, pp 30\u201331)<\/p>\n
\nright of residence for students (OJ L 180<\/a>, 13 July 1990, pp 30\u201331), <\/p>\n
\n2004, <\/a>on the
\nright of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside
\nfreely within the territory of the Member States (OJ L 158\/77<\/a>, 30 April 2004, pp 77\u2013123)<\/p>\n
\n1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the
\nCommunity for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the
\nprovision of services.<\/p>\n
\ncoordination of social security systems, (OJ L 200\/1<\/a>, 7 June 2004, pp 1\u201349) <\/p>\n
\nfreedom of movement for workers within the Union (codification) <\/strong>Official Journal of the European Union L141 of 27.5.2011<\/em><\/p>\n
\ndown the procedure for implementing Regulation 883\/2004\/EC on the coordination
\nof social security systems, (OJ L 284\/1<\/a>, 30 October 2009, pp 1\u201342).<\/p>\nBooks<\/h3>\n
\n(Sweet and Maxwell, 1997)<\/p>\n
\nsubstantive law of the EU: the four freedoms<\/em> (Fifth edn, Oxford University
\nPress 2016)<\/p>\n
\nImiscoe and Dawsonera, Migration and citizenship: legal status, rights and
\npolitical participation<\/em> (Amsterdam University Press 2006)<\/p>\n
\nBu\u0155ca G and Ebook C, The Evolution of EU Law<\/em> (2nd edn, OUP Oxford 2011)<\/p>\n
\nB\u00farca G, EU law: text, cases, and materials<\/em> (Sixth edn, Oxford
\nUniversity Press 2015)<\/p>\n
\nCitizenship and Social Rights\u201d, in J.-Y. Carlierand E. Guild, eds., The Future of Free Movement of Persons in the
\nEU, Bruyland, Bruxelles, 65-78.<\/p>\n
\nand Oxford Scholarship Online L, The coherence of EU Free Movement law:
\nconstitutional responsibility and the Court of Justice<\/em> (First edn, Oxford
\nUniversity Press 2013)<\/p>\n
\nPalgrave C, Limits of transnationalism: Collective identities and EU
\nintegration<\/em> (Palgrave Macmillan 2011)<\/p>\nArticles & Websites<\/h3>\n
\nMercenier H, \u2018Free movement and EU citizenship: a virtuous circle?\u2019<\/em>
\n[Routledge] 23 Journal of European Public Policy 1139<\/p>\n
\nmigration, citizenship and political union\u2019<\/em> (ENGLAND) [Wiley Blackwell] 32
\nJournal of common market studies 369<\/p>\n
\nothers, \u2018Developing an Ever Closer Union between the Peoples of Europe? A
\nReappraisal of the Case Law of the Court of Justice on the Free Movement of
\nPersons and EU Citizenship\u2019<\/em> [Oxford University Press] 27 Yearbook of
\nEuropean law 167<\/p>\n
\never, can restrictions on free movement be justified on economic grounds?\u2019<\/em>
\n41 European Law Review 147 <\/a><\/p>\n
\nFree Movement and the EU Referendum<\/em>\u2019 (London, England) [SAGE Publications]
\n236 National Institute Economic Review 14<\/p>\n
\nrights: The missing pieces of European citizenship<\/em>?\u2019 [German Law Journal]
\n14 German law journal 2021<\/p>\n
\nSchade D, \u2018Buying into Myths: Free Movement of People and Immigration\u2019 <\/em>(Hoboken)
\n[Wiley-Blackwell] 87 Political Quarterly 139<\/p>\n
\nA, \u2018Granting Citizenship-related Rights to Third-Country Nationals: An
\nAlternative to the Full Extension of European Union Citizenship?<\/em>\u2019
\n(Netherlands) [Martinus Nijhoff Publishers] 14 European Journal of Migration
\nand Law 63<\/p>\n
\n
\nUnion, Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of
\nMaastricht, 7 February 1992.<\/p>\n
\nC-184\/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v
\nCentre Public d’Aide Sociale d’Ottignes-Louvain-la-Neuve (CPAS)<\/em> [2001] ECR I-6193<\/p>\n
\nECR 2811, Case C-292\/89 Antonissen<\/em> [1991] ECR I-745<\/p>\n
\nSecretary of State for the Home Department<\/em> [2002] ECR I-7091<\/p>\n
\nL and Mercenier H, \u2018Free movement and EU citizenship: a virtuous circle<\/em>?\u2019
\n<\/a>[Routledge] 23 Journal of European Public Policy 1139 at pg. 3<\/p>\n
\nZhu and Chen <\/em>[2004] ECR 1-9925.<\/p>\n
\n73\/148\/EEC of 21 May 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and
\nresidence within the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to
\nestablishment and the provision of services<\/a><\/p>\n
\nfor the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
\nConvention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) <\/p>\n
\nCitizens Within The EU<\/em>\u2019, Matrix Chambers. (2011), pg. 6.<\/p>\n
\n41-2.<\/p>\n