<\/p>\n
Land Registration Act<\/strong><\/p>\n a)C will pursue a claim in Proprietary estoppel to prove her interest in the land as there has been no legal transfer, this is most suited for C’s claim. A constructive trust is mostly used in matrimonial cases involving a family home and if successful C will just get a share of the equity, whereas a proprietary estoppel claim could result in C gaining the whole fee simple, his being a reason why Lord Walker advocated keeping the doctrines separate.<\/p>\n Proprietary estoppel arises where \u201cit would be unconscionable for a party to be permitted to deny that which…he has allowed or encouraged another to assume to his detriment\u201c This comes in three principal parts, assurance, reliance and detriment. If these three are satisfied then the court will award a discretionary remedy. These three must be looked at \u201cin the round\u201d and are often interrelated, however for convenience they will be addressed separately.<\/p>\n Here, the assurance could take two forms. Either S said \u201cif you stay working for me, I will make sure you\u2019re all right\u201d(A) or \u201cif you stay with me, I will leave you my health clinic when I decide to retire\u201d(B). C’s success will depend on which one was said, The judge will decide this based on the evidence.<\/p>\n A valid assurance must “relate to identified property owned by the defendant”, ghe statement must be linked to a property right. The statement in the present case could relate to anything from a pension to the whole fee simple. It is impossible to determine where it lies and whether it does relate to an identified property.<\/p>\n Furthermore, since Thorner v Major we ask is it reasonable for the claimant, in the light of all the facts, to rely on the assurance? \u201cThe question is whether his words and acts would reasonably have conveyed…an assurance that he would [inherit the farm]\u201d In the present case, the assurance is ambiguous, it could lead to any result. There are many ways of making sure someone is \u201call right\u201d when you retire. Thus it is not reasonable for C to rely on this as an estoppel generating assurance, and any detriment she may have incurred will be at her own risk.<\/p>\n If this was the statement made, C would have no intrerest in S’s property. She may be eligible for a restitutionary remedy based on quantum meruit, but this does not affect the interest in the property.<\/p>\n This statement clearly fulfils the requirement of being linked to a property right, S expressly offers the fee simple of the health clinic when he retires. Therefore it would be reasonable for C to rely on this assurance. However there has been troubles in the courts with regards to promises relating to a future right in property.<\/p>\n In Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row, Lord Walker stated that the claimant must believe that \u201cthe assurance on which he or she relied was legally binding and irrevocable\u201d. In the present case, following this criteria, C’s claim would fail. C has no grounds to believe that the promise is legally binding and irrevocable. This seems to protect the right for people to change their mind regarding their promises<\/p>\n Thorner v Major changed the criterion, it must be reasonably understood by C that S is making a commitment. There is no problem with that in the present case, the promise is \u201cclear and unequivocal\u201d prima facie and in the context.<\/p>\n C has to show that she relied on this assurance to her detriment. Here the alleged detriment is, passing up the opportunity for a law degree, her enhanced role in the clinic with no extra pay including her renovations such as new computers and planning a new floor.<\/p>\n The courts have taken a wide view on what counts as detrimental, it is not just limited to financial detriment, it \u201cmust be approached as part of abroad inquiry as to whether repudiation of an assurance is or is not unconscionable\u201d.<\/p>\n From Gillet v Holt, we know that loss of opportunity, and lower than usual wages do count as a detriment and it is obvious that by paying for improvements to the Heath Centre she is acting to her detriment. She has missed 9 years of potentially increased wages, and perhaps a lifetime of the advantages of a law degree. Furthermore it seems that she has improved the business with new computers with her own money, and is taking the role of someone who does or will soon own the property, evidenced by the planning permission application. This is a sufficient detriment to create unconscionably.<\/p>\n Reliance is inferred by the court if there is a clear assurance and subsequently a detriment. The onus is on the defendant to prove that the detriment was motivated by another factor. This is followed by Wayling v Jones which only looks for a \u201csufficient link\u201d between the detriment and the assurance.<\/p>\n She clearly gave up the degree opportunity on reliance of the assurance, as it was a condition to the assurance; \u201cif you stay working for me…\u201d. Although the other detriments came up to 20 years after the initial assurance which may affect the \u201csufficient link\u201d, it seems that but for the assurance C would not have done them. She replaced the desks with a view of improving the property for herself when she is owner.<\/p>\n C does have a successful claim in proprietary estoppel if statement B was said. However the remedy here can range from nothing to the whole fee simple. In Jennings v Rice Walker LJ creates a formulation to guide the courts remedial discretion. In cases where the assurance and the detriment needed to secure the assurance are made clear \u201cthe court’s natural response is to fulfil the claimant’s expectations\u201d. This case is one of those cases. S clearly states the assurance \u201c I will leave you my health clinic\u201d, and the detriment needed \u201cif you stay working with me [instead of getting a degree]\u201d. Therefore the court will be likely to offer what was promised, which is the clinic.<\/p>\n b)Emily will base her claim for an equitable interest in The Firs on a constructive trust, as there has been no declaration of trust complying with the Land Registration Act 1925. nor would a resulting trust be appropriate as we do not know whether Emily(E) contributed towards the purchase price, nor did she contribute to the mortgage following Laskar v Laskar. Furthermore in Stack v Dowden it was agreed that a resulting trust should not be used in domestic cases such as this as it only takes account of one factor out of many.<\/p>\n The form E’s claim takes depends whether or not her name is on the land register title. If Satvinder is the only legal title holder then E will have to prove there is a common intention constructive trust by showing there was a common intention for E to have an interest and that she acted to her detriment based on this.<\/p>\n Here the courts look for \u201cthe result which reflects what the parties must be taken to have intended\u201d. In Lloyds Bank v Rosset there were two ways of proving this intention. The first way is to show that \u201cprior to acquisition\u201d there was and \u201cagreement or understanding\u201d between the parties based on evidence of \u201cexpress discussions\u201d. This could be the case with Emily, as Satvinder did intend to put Emily on the land register title if he thought she could be on it, so it is likely they would have discussed it, however there is no explicit evidence for this.<\/p>\n In the second method the courts have to \u201crely entirely on the conduct of the parties\u201d Which now following Oxley v Hiscock and Stack v Dowden relates to the \u201cwhole course of dealings\u201d of the parties and not just to \u201ccontributions to the purchase price by the partner\u201d. We do not know if E contributed to the purchase price or not, but Baroness Hale sets out that \u201cmany more factors than financial contributions\u201d can amount to a common intention. In this case there is a common intention that Emily will get at least some interest in the property. The \u201carrangements…to meet the outgoings\u201d are made equally, with S paying the mortgage and E paying the other bills, which was decided \u201cat the outset\u201d, which indicates their intentions at acquisition, even if E soon stopped paying the bills to look after the children, the intention is there. Additionally having children is also a factor which Baroness Hale points to. \u201cContext is everything\u201d, and in this particular context the household is run in a very equal way with both taking on important household responsibilities.<\/p>\n As equity will not assist a volunteer, Emily will need to demonstrate a detrimental reliance based on this common intention. As in Rosset and Stack, the same evidence for the intention can be the detriment. Detriment can be \u201cmaterial sacrifice by way of contribution to or economy in the general family expenditure\u201d, which is definitely shown by Emily in paying the bills. A greater act of detriment is shown by her renovating the gardens with her own money. We need to consider if Emily’s conduct \u201ccould not reasonably have been expected…unless she was to have an interest in the house\u201d Emily would not have renovated the garden, with her own money and time, if she was not to have any right in the property, therefore she has acted to her detriment.<\/p>\n As the parties have not expressly stated how the equity will be shared, Emily’s interest is \u201cthat which the parties intended\u201d. Oxley v Hiscock has replaced the old quantification by financial contribution with \u201ca share the count considers fair having regard to the whole course of dealing\u201d. So in Emily’s whole course of dealing with the property with Satvinder, she has shown to have taken on household responsibilities (either paying bills or looking after the children) and has also spent her own time and money on renovations, while Satvinder paid the mortgage, therefore it seems from the \u201cnature of their relationship\u201d that they both equally share the responsibilities and thus a judge would probably award Emily 50% of the equity.<\/p>\n If Emily were the joint legal owner, \u201cthe presumption will be that equity follows the law\u201d, i.e that Emily has 50% of the equity. As Emily wishes to show that she owns 75% of the equity, the burden is on her to prove that \u201cthe parties did intend their beneficial interests to be different from their legal interests\u201d. This according to Hale is \u201cunlikely\u201d would require \u201cvery unusual\u201d facts, such as in Stack v Dowden as one partner had paid much more towards the household, and both knew it, and also their finances were completely separate. Here although Satvinder’s and Emily’s bank accounts are separate, it is for a reason that does not relate the The Firs, it is to protect Emily if the business fails. Other than this all their other domestic dealings have been more or less equal in their responsibilities, as discussed above. Emily cannot argue that the garden renovations are evidence to skew the equity in her favour as this activity is \u201cthe most natural thing in the world\u201d in a property jointly owned.<\/p>\n c) Firstly there must be a valid contract, the requirements for which are set out in the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (LP(MP)A). Here Tam and Satvinder have complied with the formalities. The documents are in writing and incorporate all the terms in each document identically if, as in this case, there is an exchange of contracts. Secondly the documents must be signed by both parties to the contract. However this does not mean that Satvider and Tam must sign both documents, it is sufficient that \u201ceach of the parties…have signed (at least) one of the documents incorporating all the terms expressly agreed\u201d Tam is elibable for specific performance of the contract as he is not a \u201cvolunteer\u201d, he has supplied consideration, which is the \uff6320,000 purchase price. Furthermore equity will only assits Tam with specific performance if he has come with \u201cclean hands\u201d, nor will the contract be valid if there is any evidence of misrepresentation. However there is no evidence to suggest that Tam had for example lied to Satvinder about the value of the land, in order to buy it at a very low price.<\/p>\n The court would order Satvinder to carry out the contract. So he would be required to transfer the deed to Tam. There must be a deed, which must be made clear that it is a deed, and validly executed as a deed. This is done by the deed being signed in the presence of a witness and it must be delivered as a deed.<\/p>\n As this transaction was made after the `1st October 2003, the land must be registered within two months, if not the sale is void. Although this contract was made 5 years ago, Tam does not need to register until there is \u201cthe transfer of a qualifying estate\u201d, which is at the point the deed is made. Satvinder has made no deed yet so the two month time limit does not apply yet. Once the deed is conveyed, which Satvinder must do, Tam must resgister the land for the transfer to be effective in law.<\/p>\n Land Registration Act 1925 Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row [2008] UKHL 55 Gardner, \u201cThe Remedial Discretion in Proprietary Estoppel \u2013 Again\u201d, 2006 LQR 492 Bridge: Personal Property Law, 3rd Ed, OUP, 2002 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[16],"tags":[85],"class_list":["post-4357","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-free-law-essaysland-law","tag-uk-law"],"yoast_head":"\nMARK:<\/h3>\n
Assurance<\/h3>\n
Statement A<\/h3>\n
Statement B<\/h3>\n
Detrimental Reliance.<\/h3>\n
The Remedy<\/h3>\n
Common Intentions<\/h3>\n
Detrimental Reliance<\/h3>\n
Quantification<\/h3>\n
\nAs there has been a valid contract, Tam will be entitled to specific performance should Satvinder fail to perform and is regarded from this point as the equitable owner of the land inder the doctrine in Walsh v Lonsdale, where it is was held that as equity \u201cregards that which ought to be done as done\u201d, the situation is treated as if the land were conveyed and Satvinder is holding the land on bare trust for Tam.<\/p>\nBibliography<\/h3>\n
\nLand Registration Act 2002
\nLand Registration Rules 2003
\nLaw of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989<\/p>\n
\nCommision for New Towns v Cooper [1995] Ch. 259
\nGissing v Gissing [1971] A.C. 886
\nGreasley v Cooke [1980] 1 WLR 1306
\nJennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159
\nLaskar v Laskar [2008] 1 WLR 2695
\nLloyd’s Bank v Rosset [1991] 1 AC 107
\nOxley v Hiscock [2004] 3 All E.R. 703
\nTaylor Fashions v Liverpool Victoria [1982] Q.B. 133
\nThorner v Major [2009] UKHL 19
\nThorner v Major [2009] UKHL 19
\nWayling v Jones [1993] 69 P&CR 170<\/p>\n
\nGardner, \u201cThe Remedial Discretion in Proprietary Estoppel \u201d, 1999 LQR 438
\nMcFarlane and Robertson, \u201cApocalypse averted: proprietary estoppel in the House of Lords\u201d, 2009 LQR 535
\nMcFarlane and Robertson, \u201cThe Death of proprietary estoppel \u201d, 2008 LMCLQ 449<\/p>\n
\nDixon, Modern Land Law, 6th Ed, Cavendish 2009
\nGrey & Grey: Modern Land Law, 5th Ed, OUP, 2009
\nHanbury & Martin, Modern Equity, 17th Ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2005
\nLawson & Rudden, The Law of Property, 3rd Ed,, OUP 2002<\/p>\n