Antarctica is the fifth largest continent on earth and accounts for one-tenth of its total land surface. 98% of the surface of Antarctica is covered with polar icecaps that are 2,160 metres thick on average, which in turn contains about 90% of the earth\u2019s fresh water in the form of ice. Antarctica is also a land rich in marine living resource, with its ice playing an important role in controlling the temperature of the oceans. Indeed, Antarctica is one of the few remaining unspoiled regions in the world. To protect and preserve the precious Antarctic environment, the Antarctic Treaty was adopted in 1959 and took effect in 1961 and presently has signatories. <\/p>\n
(i) Discuss the Territorial In Article Article The The Article Article (ii) Discuss the Although the treaty (iii) Discuss the It is true that the Firstly, for many Secondly, the Treaty While the threat of Furthermore, the Finally, as mentioned You are a lawyer working for the government of the coastal state of Niceland, which has declared an Exclusive Economic Zone extending 200 miles from the baselines. <\/strong><\/p>\n Advise its on the i.- A Niceland warship navigating in international waters suspects According to article ii.- <\/strong>Another ship, also with the Uglyland flag, seems to be UNCLOS does not include Interdiction of a The Niceland warship is iii.- <\/strong>A Niceland warship has witnessed an oil tanker, sailing under the What if the discharge took place 20 miles from the baselines? <\/strong><\/p>\n First of all, we need to establish UNCLOS defines marine pollution as In addition to international In the instance of the discharge happening 6 In the case of the discharge iv.- <\/strong>A fishing ship, sailing under the flag of Smileland, is operating In accordance with the article 57 Pursuant to article 56 of the Convention, Niceland as the coastal state has The fishing ship of Smileland had no right to fish 100 miles from the The Niceland warship may proceed with boarding, inspection, and arrest v.- <\/strong>The government of Smileland has informed the government of The proposed submarine pipeline Given that Smileland intends to Article 19-21 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 allows states to enter reservations unless these are refused by other states or contrary to the objective of the treaty in question. <\/strong><\/p>\n In 2011, the Review the criteria established by the commission and discuss In its Guide to Practice on Part 3 of the Guide establishes the In 3.1.5.4 the ILC clarifies that a Guideline 3.1.5.6 refers to While conceding that reservations to treaties in the field of human rights are \u201cincompatible with the fundamental notion of human rights as being universal in application to every single human being\u201d[29]<\/a>, we have to agree with the ILC that such reservations should not be declared impermissible ab initio<\/em>, but should rather be subject to particular standards of examination. In our opinion, at the present time, reservations cannot altogether be avoided due to the diverging positions of states and the necessity to encourage participation of as many states as possible in the human rights treaties. The ILC attempted to improve the \u201cobject and purpose\u201d test but, ultimately, its efficiency depends on its objective enforcement. Placing the task of deciding the permissibility of reservations on an independent body, established for the purpose of interpreting the treaty and monitoring the compliance by states with its provisions, seems to be a possible solution to the problem. <\/p>\n [1]<\/a> They are Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New [2]<\/a> Stokke, Olav [3]<\/a> Gillian Triggs, The Antarctic Treaty Regime: A Workable [4]<\/a> Watts, Arthur. International law and the Antarctic [5]<\/a> Romualdo Bermejo, Antarctic System: Crisis or Success of [6]<\/a> \u201cThe Antarctic [7]<\/a> Huber J, The [8]<\/a> Martin Lishexian [9]<\/a> Martin Lishexian [10]<\/a> Christina A. [11]<\/a> \u201cChallenges for [12]<\/a> Article 110(3) UNCLOS.<\/p>\n [13]<\/a> Article 17(5) of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in [14]<\/a> Article 1(4) UNCLOS.<\/p>\n [15]<\/a> Global Marine Oil [16]<\/a> Article 220(3) UNCLOS.<\/p>\n [17]<\/a> Ibid at Article 229(5). <\/p>\n [18]<\/a> Ibid at Article 220(6).<\/p>\n [19]<\/a> Ibid at Article 58(1).<\/p>\n [20]<\/a> Ibid at Article 61.<\/p>\n [21]<\/a> Ibid at Article 62(4).<\/p>\n [22]<\/a> Ibid at Article 73. <\/p>\n [23]<\/a> Article 79(4) UNCLOS.<\/p>\n [24]<\/a> Ibid at Article 58. <\/p>\n [25]<\/a> Ibid at Article 56. <\/p>\n [26]<\/a> Ibid at Article 79(1),(2).<\/p>\n [27]<\/a> Ibid at Article 79(5).<\/p>\n
\nimportance of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty System as regards the
\nsovereignty of the parties and how this has arguably been an essential element
\nof the success of the treaty. <\/strong><\/p>\n
\ndisputes are central to the legal and political position of Antarctica. There
\nare seven states that have claimed territorial sovereignty over areas of
\nAntarctica.[1]<\/a>
\nThere is also an area over which sovereignty is not claimed by any state. The
\nstates do not all recognize each other\u2019s claims to the respective areas, and
\nthe claims of three of the states overlap to a large extent. Furthermore, no
\nother states have expressly recognized the territorial sovereignty of any of
\nthe claimant states.<\/p>\n
\nthe period preceding the conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty, conflicts ranging
\nfrom localized disputes to major rivalries of national interests dominated the
\nAntarctic region.[2]<\/a>
\nSeveral attempts to ensure international agreement were made but all proposals
\nwere met with opposition from one state or another. Finally, the Antarctic
\nTreaty was concluded in 1959. One of the main reasons for that successful
\ncooperation was the inclusion of Article IV. <\/p>\n
\nIV of the Antarctic Treaty provides that there will be no \u201crenunciation by any
\ncontracting party of previously asserted rights of and claims to\u201d or \u201cany basis
\nof claim\u201d to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. Action taken while the
\ntreaty is in force cannot constitute \u201ca basis for asserting, supporting, or
\ndenying\u201d any territorial claims, rights, or bases of claims. \u201cNo new claim or
\nenlargement of an existing claim\u201d is permitted while the Treaty is in force.<\/p>\n
\nIV effectively \u201cfreezes\u201d the legal status quo in relation to territorial claims
\nin Antarctica. <\/p>\n
\narticle creates the ambiguity that promotes important international agreement
\nwhile having no effect (either detrimental or positive) on sovereignty claims. <\/p>\n
\nprovision leaves each state to interpret its content in accordance with its
\nparticular juridical interests. Its inclusion was particularly advantageous to
\nthe superpowers: the U.S. and U.S.S.R. (now Russia). The words \u201cany basis of
\nclaim\u201d in clause 1(b) may protect the prior interests of non-claimant states
\nwhich have not previously sought to assert a claim but which might seek to do
\nso in the future. The
\nwords \u201cor those of its nationals\u201d cover claims made on behalf of, but not
\nratified by, the state concerned.[3]<\/a>\n<\/p>\n
\nIV is called the \u201ccorner-stone\u201d of the Antarctic Treaty System, without it the
\nextensive scientific research that has been taking place in Antarctica would
\nnot be possible as it involves official agencies and associates of contracting
\nparties\u2019 governments working in areas which some states consider their
\nterritory.[4]<\/a> <\/p>\n
\nIV of the Antarctic Treaty and its mirroring articles in the other treaties
\npresent an admirable example of effective dispute management where dispute
\nresolution is not feasible. Even though the disputes have not been resolved,
\nnor is it guaranteed they won\u2019t become a source of international tension in the
\nregion in the future, these provisions allowed, despite all the divergent
\ninterests, the states to cooperate closely in Antarctica in \u201cthe interest of
\nall mankind\u201d. As expressed by the British Representative to the Washington
\nConvention, Mr Heap, \u201cthe equilibrium achieved between the states by means of
\nArticle IV should not be disturbed because it is the foundation of peace in the
\nregion\u201d.[5]<\/a><\/p>\n
\neffects of Article XII subparagraphs 2) (a) of the Antarctic Treaty System. <\/strong><\/p>\n
\ndoes not provide for any specific termination date, <\/em>it has been the
\npractice of most contracting parties to regard the treaty regime as a temporary
\none and to interpret Article XII 2)(a) of the treaty as one signifying the
\ntermination of the present regime thirty years after the entry into force of
\nthe treaty. Subparagraph 2) (a) of Article XII provides that any
\nparty can call for a review conference after the expiration of thirty years
\n(i.e. in 1991). No state did so, and on the thirtieth anniversary of the Treaty
\nthe parties recognized the continuing strength and relevance of the Treaty by
\nadopting a declaration recording their determination to maintain and strengthen
\nthe Treaty and to protect Antarctica\u2019s environmental and scientific values.[6]<\/a> <\/p>\n
\nweaknesses of the Antarctic Treaty System.<\/strong><\/p>\n
\nAntarctic Treaty System has managed Antarctica effectively to date, especially
\nin keeping the region peaceful and demilitarized. However, there are certain
\nweak points that keep it from being an all-encompassing success of international
\ncooperation.<\/p>\n
\nyears, a major criticism of the System had been the lack of a central body to
\nmonitor and enforce the regulations. For most of its existence, the Antarctic
\nTreaty System operated without a permanent secretariat, which was only
\nestablished in 2004. The Secretariat is subordinate to the ATCM which sits only
\nonce a year. A former executive secretary of the Secretariat, Johannes Huber,
\nclaims that the parties display disinterest in the \u201cpractical questions of
\nensuring its implementation or even its maintenance as a clear and consistent
\nset of regulations\u201d.[7]<\/a> The Treaty
\nrelies for implementation entirely on the individual governments that are party
\nto it. While the Antarctic Treaty System provides wide powers of inspection and
\nobservation, the inspectors lack enforcement powers. For example, in the cases
\nconcerning Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Resources
\n(CCAMLR), inspectors may inspect catch, nets and other fishing gear, data, and
\nrecords on catch and location. But in the event of a breach, they are only
\nempowered to report and alert the master of vessels. Responsibility to enforce
\nthe regulation remains on the flag state.[8]<\/a>\n<\/p>\n
\nhas no force for the 140 non-parties of the System. The non-parties are not barred from exploring and exploiting the resources on the Antarctic continent
\ncontrary to principles of the Antarctic Treaty System. They may equally pose a
\nthreat if they decide to rely on other provisions of international law in their
\nactivities. For example, mining in the regulated area is prohibited by the
\nProtocol on Environmental Protection. On the other hand, regions of the
\nSouthern Ocean that lie within this area are also subject to deep-sea bed
\nregulation by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The deep-sea
\nbed may potentially be subject to resource exploitation.[9]<\/a>\n<\/p>\n
\nexploiting resources is still potential, there is an existing problem of poor
\nmarine life protection.[10]<\/a>
\nIn the absence of sovereignty over the Antarctic land and, consequently, the
\nabsence of an Exclusive Economic Zone, the entire Southern Ocean from the edge
\nof the Antarctic continent is considered high seas. All states enjoy high seas
\nfreedoms, including the freedom of fishing. CCAMLR contains regulations for
\nmanagement of Antarctic fisheries but their effectiveness is reduced by the
\ninability to enforce CCAMLR against non-party states. Even contracting parties
\ncan circumvent CCALMR\u2019s provisions by using flags of convenience.<\/p>\n
\nAntarctic Treaty System is lacking in governing the matters of jurisdiction.
\nArticle VIII of the Antarctic Treaty stipulates that observers, scientific
\npersonnel, and members of the staffs accompanying them are subject to
\njurisdiction of the state of their nationality. In case of any dispute,
\ncontracting parties are to reach an agreement via consultations. Thus, the
\nTreaty failes to include any provisions establishing a jurisdictional status
\nfor persons other than those three categories. It
\nis not clear how criminal and civil law can be enforced with respect to the non-scientific
\nvisitors and the growing numbers of tourists. <\/p>\n
\nabove, tourism has experienced significant growth in the past several years.
\nCollective impact of tourists may lead to pollution of the environment, hinder
\nthe scientific research and may pose a threat to the conservation of the
\nwilderness of Antarctica. Tourism is barely regulated by the Antarctic Treaty
\nSystem[11]<\/a>;
\nit\u2019s left to autoregulation under the International Association of Antarctic
\nTour Operators (IAATO). However, tourism operators are not obliged to join
\nIAATO and may bypass it in organizing their trips to the Antarctic. With the
\ngrowth of tourism emerges the possible commercialisation of the Antarctic
\ncontinent which raises the question whether Antarctica is still a continent
\ndevoted to science. Consequently, one may critique the fundamental condition to
\nbecome a consultative party to the Antarctic Treaty \u2013 the obligation to conduct
\nsubstantial scientific research. Will it still be relevant if scientific
\nresearch is no longer the only objective of activities performed in the region?<\/p>\n
\nfollowing situations: <\/strong><\/p>\n
\na nearby ship, sailing under the flag of Uglyland, is engaged in slave trading
\nand requests the government permission to board it. <\/strong><\/p>\n
\n110 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a warship
\nwhich encounters a foreign ship in international waters is justified in boarding
\nit if there is reasonable ground for suspecting that the foreign ship engages
\nin the slave trade. The examination should be carried with all possible
\nconsideration. Thus, the government of Niceland may give permission to board
\nthe ship of Uglyland. However, Niceland should be aware that the ship of
\nUglyland will be entitled to compensation for any loss or damage in case the
\nsuspicions prove to be unfounded[12]<\/a>.\n<\/p>\n
\ntransporting drugs. Permission is also requested. <\/strong><\/p>\n
\ndrug trafficking in the list of grounds which may justify boarding a foreign
\nship on the high seas. Instead, article 108 prescribes that all countries shall
\ncooperate in the suppression of illicit traffic of narcotic drugs and
\npsychotropic substances. The Convention promotes the flag state principle, only
\nallowing a state to request international cooperation in suppressing drug trafficking
\nwhen the state suspects a ship flying its flag of engaging in it.<\/p>\n
\nforeign ship is regulated by the United Nations Convention against Illicit
\nTraffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance. Article 17 of the
\nConvention sets forth that when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a
\nship is engaged in illicit drug transportation, the suspecting state must seek
\nthe flag state\u2019s consent before boarding the ship. <\/p>\n
\nnot allowed to board the ship flying the flag of Uglyland. The government of Niceland
\nmay request authorization from Uglyland to board and search the ship after
\nconfirming the ship is registered in Uglyland. In case of proceeding with the
\ninterdiction, the Niceland authorities should not endanger the safety of the
\nsea life, the security of the ship and its cargo or prejudice the commercial
\nand legal interests of Uglyland[13]<\/a>.\n<\/p>\n
\nflag of Uglyland, cause serious marine pollution by recklessly discharging fuel
\n6 miles from the baselines, and has followed it. Both ships are now 50 miles
\nfrom the baselines. Can it be boarded? <\/strong><\/p>\n
\nthat 6 miles from the baselines is within the territorial sea<\/em> of Niceland; and 20 miles from the baselines is
\nwithin the contiguous zone<\/em> and the EEZ<\/em> of Niceland.<\/p>\n
\n\u201cthe introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into
\nthe marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to
\nresult in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life,
\nhazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and
\nother legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water
\nand reduction of amenities\u201d[14]<\/a>.
\nDischarge of pollutants into the sea could be either deliberate dumping of
\nwastes or pollution due to shipping activities.<\/p>\n\n
\nwhat Niceland warship witnessed was an act of dumping as defined by article 1(5)
\nUNCLOS, then according to article 210 UNCLOS Uglyland would have needed an
\nexpress prior approval from Niceland before dumping within the territorial sea or
\nthe EEZ. Dumping without prior express approval of the coastal state
\nconstitutes a violation of UNCLOS.<\/li>\n
\ndue to shipping activities, it was most likely an operational discharge of fuel
\ninto the sea. International law of sea differentiates between operational and
\naccidental discharges of oil. Accidental discharges occur when there\u2019s a
\ncollision of vessels or a situation of distress at sea, such as explosion,
\nengine breakdown or running aground. Operational discharges are
\ndeliberate and result from maintenance operations.[15]<\/sup><\/a> Judging from the facts
\npresented, we assume that the oil tanker under the flag of Uglyland was not in
\ndistress at sea as it continued sailing without interruption. Operational
\ndischarge of oil by vessels is not prohibited unless it violates certain
\nstandards laid by international agreements and national legislation. The main
\nsource for regulation of pollution from ships is the 1973 International
\nConvention for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships as amended by the Protocol
\nof 1978 (MARPOL).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
\nrules and standards, a state can enact laws and regulations pertaining to
\nprevention and control of marine pollution in its territorial sea or the EEZ.<\/p>\n
\nmiles from the baselines, i.e. within the territorial sea of Niceland, article
\n220(2) UNCLOS is applicable. According to it, \u201cwhere there are clear grounds
\nfor believing that the vessel navigating in the territorial sea of a State has,
\nduring its passage therein, violated laws and regulations of that State adopted
\nin accordance with this Convention or applicable international rules and
\nstandards for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels,
\nthat State, [\u2026], may undertake physical inspection of the vessel relating to
\nthe violation and may, where the evidence so warrants, institute proceedings,
\nincluding detention of the vessel, in accordance with its laws, \u2026\u201d. If Niceland
\nwarship has reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of pollution
\nprevention laws took place, it has the right to board and inspect the oil tanker.
\nThe fact that both ships are now 50 miles from the baselines suggests that the
\nwarship had to undertake the hot pursuit in accordance with article 111 UNCLOS.
\nIt had to be commenced only after a clear signal to stop was given to the oil
\ntanker and could be continued outside the territorial sea if it had not been
\ninterrupted. Granted that all conditions
\nare adhered to, the warship may detain and board the oil tanker.<\/p>\n
\nhappening 20 miles from the baselines, i.e. within the contiguous zone and the
\nEEZ of Niceland, article 220 UNCLOS is again applicable. If Niceland has clear
\ngrounds to believe that the oil tanker violated applicable international rules
\nor regulations of Niceland for pollution prevention, Niceland may require the
\noil ranker to five information regarding its identity and port of registry, its
\nlast and next port of call and other relevant information required to establish
\nwhether any such violation has occurred[16]<\/a>.
\nIf the oil tanker failed to give relevant information and the discharge was
\nsubstantial as to cause or threat significant pollution, Niceland could
\nexercise physical inspection of the tanker[17]<\/a>.
\nIf Niceland has clear objective evidence that such discharge will cause major
\ndamage to the coastline, it may detain the oil tanker[18]<\/a>.
\nIn order to perform inspection or detention of the tanker the Niceland warship
\nmay commence the hot pursuit pursuant to article 111(2) UNCLOS and subsequently
\nboard the tanker, providing there was a clear signal to stop and the pursuit
\nwas not interrupted. <\/p>\n
\n100 miles from the coast of Niceland. When confronted by a Niceland warship, it
\nreplies it\u2019s operating in International waters and can therefore fish as much
\nas it wants. <\/strong><\/p>\n
\nUNCLOS Niceland established an Exclusive Economic
\nZone extending 200 miles from the baselines. Regardless of the method employed
\nto determine baselines, a ship operating 100 miles from the coast of Niceland
\nis operating within the Exclusive Economic Zone of Niceland. The surface waters
\nwithin the EEZ are referred to as international waters only when implying high
\nseas freedom of navigation[19]<\/a>.\n<\/p>\n
\nsovereign rights over \u201cexploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the
\nnatural resources, whether living or non-living\u201d in its EEZ. Furthermore,
\nNiceland determines the allowable catch of the living resources in the EEZ[20]<\/a>. If
\nNiceland granted access to other states to its EEZ for the purposes of
\nharvesting the living resources, nationals of these other states would have to
\ncomply with the terms and regulations established by Niceland, which may include,
\ninter alia, quotas of catch[21]<\/a>. <\/p>\n
\ncoast of Niceland, unless Smileland was given access to the living resources of
\nNiceland\u2019s EEZ, in which case the amount of allowable catch is not \u201cas much as
\nit wants\u201d but that established by Niceland. <\/p>\n
\nof the Smileland ship as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws
\nand regulations of Niceland[22]<\/a>.<\/p>\n
\nNiceland of its intention to lay down a submarine pipeline near a pre-existing
\none laid some years ago by Niceland. The pipeline would be laid at a distance
\nfrom baselines ranging from 10 to 300 miles. <\/strong><\/p>\n
\nwill be laid in several maritime zones: the territorial sea (10 to 12 miles),
\nthe EEZ (12 to 200 miles) and the continental shelf (200 to 300 miles) of
\nNiceland. <\/p>\n\n
\nfor pipelines entering its territorial sea[23]<\/a>.
\nNiceland may also adopt regulations restricting the innocent passage through
\nits territorial sea to protect existing cables and pipelines, and the living
\nresources of the sea.<\/li>\n
\nrelevant limitations, the freedoms referred to in article 87, including the
\nfreedom of laying submarine pipelines[24]<\/a>.
\nTherefore, Smileland\u2019s activities of laying the pipeline are subject to
\nNiceland\u2019s sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage natural
\nand living resources of its EEZ.[25]<\/a><\/li>\n
\ncontinental shelf subject to the coastal state\u2019s right \u201cto take reasonable
\nmeasures for the exploration of the continental shelf, the exploitation of its
\nnatural resources and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from
\npipelines\u201d.[26]<\/a>
\nIt is also necessary to acquire consent of the coastal state to the proposed
\ncourse of laying the pipeline. <\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
\nlay its pipeline close to the pipeline laid by Niceland, Smileland should give
\nthe latter due regard and ensure that the possibilities of repairing the
\nNiceland\u2019s pipeline are not prejudiced.[27]<\/a><\/p>\n
\nInternational Law Commission has discussed whether reservations should be
\npermitted in the field of human rights. <\/p>\n
\nwhether or not you consider that reservations should be permitted in the area
\nof human rights. <\/strong><\/p>\n
\nReservations to Treaties[28]<\/a>
\ncompleted in 2011 the International Law Commission (ILC) did not have a
\nseparate guideline relating to human right treaties. Instead, it opted for more
\ngeneral terms and urging consideration of the specifics of the treaty under
\nreview. <\/p>\n
\ncriteria for permissibility of reservations. It starts with reproducing the
\ncontents of Article 19 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. According to guideline
\n3.1 a reservation is permissible unless: a) it is prohibited by the treaty; b)
\nit is not among the specified reservations permitted by the treaty: c) it is
\nincompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. Regarding the field of
\nhuman rights, most issues arise when specifying the notions of \u201cobject and
\npurpose\u201d of a treaty. Guideline 3.1.5. gives the general idea of the meaning of
\nthe expression and guideline 3.1.5.1 provides a method of determining the
\n\u201cobject and purpose\u201d of the treaty. The next guidelines that apply specifically
\nto human rights are 3.1.5.4 and 3.1.5.6. <\/p>\n
\nreservation is not permitted to a provision \u201cconcerning rights from which no
\nderogation is permissible under any circumstances, unless the reservation in
\nquestion is compatible with the essential rights and obligations arising out of
\nthat treaty\u201d.<\/p>\n
\ntreaties \u201ccontaining numerous interdependent rights and obligations\u201d which is
\nusually the case of treaties in the field of human rights. In assessing the
\ncompatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of such treaties,
\naccount should be taken of the importance of the provision in question within
\nthe general scope of the treaty, and also the extent of its importance on the
\ntreaty. Therefore, it can be inferred that certain right protected by international
\ntreaties may be less essential than others, and even in the case of essential
\nrights, reservations may be permissible if they do not impede protection of the
\nrights and do not excessively modify their legal regime. <\/p>\n
\n
\nZealand, Norway, the United Kingdom.<\/p>\n
\nSchram., and Davor Vidas. Governing the Antarctic: the effectiveness and
\nlegitimacy of the Antartic Treaty System. Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.
\n49, books.google.ru\/books?id=hGC6ShBYdy0C&lpg=PP1&hl=ru&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false.
\nAccessed 20 Apr. 2017.<\/p>\n
\nCompromise or a Purgatory of Ambiguity, 17 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 1985, p.
\n200, heinonline.org\/HOL\/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals\/cwrint17&div=&id=201&page=.
\nAccessed 10 Apr. 2017. <\/p>\n
\nTreaty system. Vol. 11, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 126,
\nbooks.google.ru\/books?id=etNtoK1kqJYC&printsec=frontcover&hl=ru#v=onepage&q&f=false.
\nAccessed 10 Apr. 2017<\/p>\n
\nMultilateralism, 22 Comp. & Int’l L.J. S. Afr. 1989, p. 22 <\/p>\n
\nTreaty Explained.\u201d British Antarctic Survey,
\nwww.bas.ac.uk\/about\/antarctica\/the-antarctic-treaty\/the-antarctic-treaty-explained\/.
\nAccessed 11 Apr. 2017.<\/p>\n
\nAntarctic Treaty: Towards a new partnership, Berkman PA et al. (eds), Science
\nDiplomacy: Antarctica, Science and the Governance of International Spaces.
\nWashington DC: Smithsonian Institution, 2011, p. 44, www.atsummit50.org\/media\/book-14.pdf.
\nAccessed 13 Apr. 2017.<\/p>\n
\nLee, A Case for World Government of the Antarctic, 9 Gonz. J. Int’l L. 2005, p.
\n84,
\nwww.law.gonzaga.edu\/gjil\/2006\/04\/a-case-for-world-government-of-the-antarctic\/.
\nAccessed 12 Apr. 2017.<\/p>\n
\nLee, A Case for World Government of the Antarctic, p. 83.<\/p>\n
\nHoefsmit, Southern Ocean Shakeup: Establishing Sovereignty in Antarctica and
\nthe Consequences for Fishery Management, 15 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 2010, p.
\n565, heinonline.org\/HOL\/Page?handle=hein.journals\/rwulr15&start_page=547&collection=journals&id=551.
\nAccessed 19 Apr. 2017.<\/p>\n
\nthe Antarctic Treaty System.\u201d Vereniging voor de Verenigde Naties,
\nwww.vvn.be\/wereldbeeld\/challenges-antarctic-treaty-system\/. Accessed 20 Apr.
\n2017.<\/p>\n
\nNarcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance.<\/p>\n
\nPollution Information Gateway – Oil spills (Accidental discharges). oils.gpa.unep.org\/facts\/oilspills.htm.
\nAccessed 15 Apr. 2017.<\/p>\n