implied malice: \u2018with intend to do serious bodily harm.\u2019 P562 casebook.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\nHyam v DPP [1974] p562 case book.<\/p>\n
Facts: appellant set fire to a dwelling house by deliberately pouring petrol through the letter box and igniting it. 4 people were in the house = mrs Booth and her 3 children. The 2 girls died. The appellant motive was jealousy of mrs booth that she was going to marry mr Jones. She claims that she only intended to frighten mrs booth by the fire but not to cause death or GBH. Jury was directed that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that she intended to kill or cause gbh to booth. If they were satisfied that when she set fire she knew it was highly probable that this would cause death\/serious bodily harm, then the necessary intend would have been established, therefore it doesn\u2019t matter if her motive was to frighten mrs booth.<\/p>\n
Held: CA dismissed the appeal and in giving leave to appeal to the HOL , certified that \u2026this point is of general public importance :<\/p>\n
\u2018is malice aforethought in the crime of murder established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that when doing the act which led to the death of another the accused knew that it was highly probable that the act would result in death or serious bodily harm?<\/em>\u2018 p563 casebook.<\/p>\nLord Hailsham rejected the argument that \u2018a consequence foreseen as highly probable is intended.\u2019 <\/em>P563.he stated that: \u2018if a man in full knowledge of the danger involved, and without lawful excuse, deliberately does that which exposes a victim to a risk of the probable grievous bodily harm\u2026 or death, and the victim dies, the perpetrator of the crime is guilty of murder and not manslaughter to the same extent as if he had actually intended the consequence to follow, and irrespective of whether he wished it.<\/em>\u2018 P564 = appeal dismissed.<\/p>\nLord hailsham in Hyam [1975] stated in his judgment that \u2018intention was to be distinguished from desire and foresight of probable consequence.\u2019 P57\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\nMoloney (1985)<\/p>\n
Facts: appellant (M) and stepfather (S) drank heavily at a wedding. They were awake all night and heard laughing and talking in a friendly way until 4.00am when a gunshot was heard. M phoned the police saying that he had killed his father. He said they disagreed as to who was quicker at loading and firing a shotgun. M was first to load. S said that if \u2018u have the guts pull the trigger.\u2019 M pulled and S was dead (he didn\u2019t aim though)<\/p>\n
Held: m was convicted of murder (due to Stephen BJ\u2019s direction of the jury in relation to intention) appeal dismissed by CA, appealed to HOL.<\/p>\n
Lord Bridge held: Stephen\u2019s direction was unsatisfactory and misleading, he stated: \u2018on review of the whole evidence they (the jury) either think that the intend did not exist or they are left in doubt as to the intent, the prisoner is entitled to be acquitted.\u2019<\/em><\/p>\nMurder = intention, it should have the same meaning throughout common law, should be kept simple.<\/p>\n
Jury must consider 2 Qs:<\/p>\n
\n- \u2018Was death \u2026 in a murder case a natural consequence of the defendant\u2019s voluntary act?<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
\n- Did the def foresee the consequence as being a natural consequence of his act? The jury should have been told if they answered YES to both Qs, it is a proper for them to draw that he intended that consequence.\u2019<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
(Jury can infer that he intended that consequence if D foresaw death as a natural consequence)<\/p>\n
Appeal dismissed.<\/p>\n
Hancock & Shankland (1986)<\/p>\n
Facts: h + s were miners on strike. They objected to a miner (x) going to work. X was going to work in a taxi driven by the deceased W. they pushed a concrete weighing 65 lbs form a bridge over the road along which X was being driven by W. block struck taxi\u2019s windscreen and W died.<\/p>\n
Held: they were prepared to plead guilty to manslaughter but crown decided to pursue a charge of murder. Defence was= they didn\u2019t intend to kill to cause serious bodily harm to anyone, but merely to block the road. Jury directed in accordance to the moloney guidelines and were convicted of murder. Direction by the judge relating to foresight of consequence was given = \u2018natural consequence\u2019 . appeal was based on the ambiguity of the phrase , p61 text. CA quashed the conviction, and the crown appealed to the HOL = appeal dismissed = manslaughter.<\/p>\n
Lord Scarman : \u2018\u2026 it is necessary to direct a jury on the issue of intend by reference to foresight of consequences the probability of death or serious injury resulting from the act done may be critically important. Its importance will depend on the degree of probability. If the likelihood that death pr serious injury will result is high, the probability of that result may\u2026 be seen as overwhelming evidence of the existence of the intent to kill or injure<\/em>\u2026\u2019 p61textbook he continued \u2026 \u2018I accept the view of the CA that the Moloney guidelines are defective (and they also) require an explanation that the greater the probability of a consequence the more likely it is that the consequence was foreseen and that, if that consequence was foreseen, the greater the probability is that , that consequence was also intended\u2019<\/em> p61 textbook and p 125 casebook.<\/p>\nNedrick {1986]<\/p>\n
Facts: N having threatened to \u2018burn out\u2019 a woman against whom he bore a grudge, poured paraffin through her letterbox and set it alight. Her child died in the fire.<\/p>\n
Held: direction given to the jury based on passage in Archbold (before Moloney) which was disapproved in the case and was to the effect that the def was guilty of murder if he knew that it was highly probable that his act would result in serious bodily injury to someone in the house. CA quashed conviction and substituted verdict of manslaughter. Appeal dismissed.<\/p>\n
Lord Lane: \u2018if the jury are satisfied that \u2026 the def recognised that death or serious harm would be virtually certain to result from his voluntary act, then that is a fact from which they may find it easy to infer that he intended to kill or do serious harm, even though he may not have had any desire to achieve that result.\u2019 P30\/1 booklet. \u00a0<\/em><\/p>\nWoolin (1998)<\/p>\n
Facts: the appellant threw his 3 year old son on a hard surface after loosing his temper, after which his so sustained a fractural skull and died. He was charged with murder.<\/p>\n
Held: the legal issue to be decided was whether the appellant nevertheless had the intention to cause serious harm. The judge directed the jury that if there were satisfied that the appellant \u2018must have realised and appreciated when he threw that child that there was a sustainable risk that he would cause serious injury to it\u2026\u2019 then they should convict his of murder. The jury found that he had the necessary intention and hence convicted hi of murder.<\/p>\n
Obiter dicta in judgement: lord lane:<\/p>\n
The jury must ask themselves 2 Qs:<\/p>\n
\u2018How probable was the consequence which resulted from the def\u2019s voluntary act? AND did he foresee that consequence \u2026 if he didn\u2019t appreciate the death or serious harm was likely to result from his act, he cannot have intended to bring it about.\u2019 P128casebook<\/p>\n
In Woolin Lord Steyn in his judgment affirmed that the case requires Nedrick direction relation to virtual certainty and also Nedrick stated \u2018what state of mind (in the absence of a purpose to kill or cause serious harm) is sufficient of murder.\u2019<\/em> P64text. Also in reformulating Nedrick lord s substituted the words \u2018infer\u2019 for the word \u2018find\u2019 p64ttext.<\/p>\nText book also comments on few problems with the virtual certainty issue__ is it important for revision to include???? P64\/5<\/p>\n
Basic, specific and ulterior intent, p69\/70 text book<\/p>\n
\n- Basic intent: offences for which the mental element requires is: intention, knowledge or recklessness. \u2018Basic mens rea\u2019: offences committed recklessly = no requirement that intention be proved.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
\n- Basic intent crimes: \u2018those crimes whose definition expressed a mens rea which does not go beyond the actus reus.\u2019<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
\n- Ulterior intent crimes: \u2018mens rea requires a proof of an intention to bring about a consequence beyond the actual actus reus of an offence.\u2019 P70 textbook.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
\n- Specific intent: covers crimes of ulterior intent and other offences where the D pleads lack of mens rea due to intoxication when he committed the catus reus.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
Manslaughter:<\/p>\n
\u2018Covers all unlawful homicide which is not murder.\u2019 P278textbook<\/em><\/p>\n2 categories: Voluntary and Involuntary Manslaughter;<\/p>\n
\n- Voluntary M: \u2018\u2026accused killed with malice aforethought\u2026 thus could be convicted of murder, but there are mitigating circumstances present reducing his culpability.\u2019 <\/em>i.e. diminished responsibility or provocation = conviction of manslaughter. Has not been studied yet!!!<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
\n- Involuntary M: when the accused commits unlawful killing but without malice aforethought but nevertheless had a culpable state of mind. Covers middle ground between accidental death and murder. If the killing was unlawful and the d didn\u2019t have the mes reus then he will be convicted of manslaughter.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
AG ref (no. 3 of 1994) [1997]<\/p>\n
Facts: the def stabbed his pregnant girlfriend in the abdomen. No injury to the foetus was detected; she was born prematurely n died later due to complications arising from her premature birth. He was charged with murder. Trial judge directed an acquittal on the grounds that no conviction for either murder or manslaughter was possible in law. Before CA 3 arguments were raised :<\/p>\n
\n- First: an \u2018unexpected difference of mode by which the relevant consequences occur should be regarded as serving the chain of causation if it is sufficiently far removed from the intended mode.\u2019<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n